Submitted by ilene on 01/03/2011 00:48 -0500

George Soros: The United States Must Stop Resisting The Orderly Decline Of The Dollar, The Coming Global Currency And The New World Order

Courtesy of Michael Snyder of Economic Collapse

In the video you are about to see, George Soros talks about "the creation of a New World Order", he discusses the need for a "managed decline" of the U.S. dollar and he talks at length of the global need for a true world currency. So just who is George Soros? Well, he is a billionaire "philanthropist" who came to be known as "the Man Who Broke the Bank of England" when he raked in a staggering one billion dollars during the 1992 "Black Wednesday" currency crisis. These days Soros is most famous for being perhaps the most "politically active" (at least openly) billionaire in the world. His Open Society Institute is in more than 60 countries and it spends approximately $600 million a year promoting the ideals that Soros wants promoted. Soros and his pet organizations have played a key role in quite a few "revolutions" around the globe over the last several decades, but these days the main goal of George Soros is to bring political change to the United States.
So exactly what is it that George Soros is trying to accomplish? Well, in a nutshell, what he wants is a Big Brother-style one world government based on extreme European-style socialism, strict population control and the radical green agenda. It would be a world where the state tightly regulates everything that we do for the greater benefit of the environment and of society as a whole.
However, Soros is not the "mastermind of the New World Order" that some have tried to make him out to be. The truth is that to those in the international banking elite, Soros is considered to be something of a "black sheep" and an "outsider". Much of what Soros is trying to accomplish lines up with the goals of the international banking elite, but what they don't like is that Soros won't stop publicly talking about a global currency and a "New World Order". Of course the international banking elite very much want a global currency and a "New World Order", but what they don't need is a "squeaky wheel" like Soros running around drawing unneeded attention to those goals.
Also, Soros does not seem to understand that both sides of the political spectrum in the United States are deeply influenced by the international banking elite. Sadly, the truth is that the same handful of elitist organizations has dominated the cabinets of every single president that we have had since World War II. If you doubt this, just check out how many members of each presidential administration over the last 40 years have belonged to either the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission or the Bilderberg Group. If you have never looked into this before, you will be absolutely shocked. No matter what president we elect, it is always the exact same organizations that always dominate their cabinets.
But Soros still seems very much trapped within the left/right paradigm and he seems absolutely obsessed with destroying the Republican Party. For example, Soros spent an insane amount of money attempting to defeat George W. Bush back in 2004. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, George Soros donated $23,581,000 during that election cycle to political organizations that were trying to keep Bush from being reelected.
Soros has also been a tremendous backer of Barack Obama, although lately Soros seems a bit disenchanted with him. Through organizations such as the Center for American Progress and MoveOn.org, Soros is constantly trying to influence the state of American politics.
So what is George Soros thinking about these days? Well, in the video posted below you will see Soros discussing "an orderly decline" of the U.S. dollar, the coming global currency and the importance of the New World Order....

Did you noticed how uncomfortable Soros was when he was saying the term "New World Order"?
The truth is that he knows exactly what that phrase means. He knows that it is a phrase that he probably shouldn't say and that will get a lot of attention.
But he said it anyway.
Soros also seemed a bit uncomfortable as he discussed "an orderly decline" of the U.S. dollar.
Soros has been saying the the U.S. dollar needs to go down for quite a while now, and he speaks of the coming fall of the dollar as if it is inevitable.
The only thing that Soros seems to fear is that the "managed decline" of the dollar could "get out of hand" and could lead to global financial chaos.
Soros even had the gall to say that having the dollar be the reserve currency of the world is not in our national interest and that a move to a global currency is "a healthy, if painful, adjustment" that we are just going to have to endure for the greater good of the world economy.
But shouldn't the American people have something to say about all of this?
Perhaps the American people do not want a "managed decline" of the U.S. dollar.
Perhaps the American people do not want any part of a new "global currency".
Perhaps the American people do not want any part of a "New World Order".
But to men like George Soros, it doesn't really matter what "the little people" think. In the world that Soros lives in, those with overwhelming amounts of money and power know what is best for the rest of us, and if "the little people" don't seem to want to go along initially then public opinion can be bought if you just spend enough money.
The sad truth is that we already live in a global economy. Just go into just about any store across the United States and start picking up products to see where they were made. Very few of the things we buy are still made in the United States.
Today, labor is a global commodity. American workers must now directly compete for jobs with those making slave labor wages in China and India. The fact that millions of U.S. jobs are being offshored and outsourced does not bother advocates of globalism at all because it is supposedly a beneficial thing for the overall global economy.
And most Americans have little to no idea just how much influence international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO have over our daily lives.
The truth is that we already live in a world that has been deeply, deeply integrated. As this continues, at some point it will only seem "natural" for America to agree to a true global currency and full global political integration.
Let us hope that day never arrives. Or at least let us hope that the American people wake up enough to not just go passively into a "New World Order".
A global economy is bad for America and a global government would be really bad for America.
But perhaps you disagree. Perhaps you believe that integrating our economy, our currency and our government with the rest of the world would be a wonderful thing. If that is the case, please feel free to leave a comment explaining exactly why globalism is such a wonderful thing for all of us....

http://the-classic-liberal.com/power-elite-analysis/
EXCERPT:

Power Elite Analysis

theCL 2010-07-27 Democrats, Politics, Progressive, Republicans

A little more than a week ago, I drew your attention to the superbly written essay, "America's Ruling Class -- And the Perils of Revolution," by retired Boston University professor Angelo Codevilla. If you haven't haven't had an opportunity to read it yet, please do. Because it provides one of the most important analytical frameworks of our time.
Because we've been beaten over the head with Marxist "class conflict" for so long, most of us simply ignore the idea of class altogether. But it was in fact the classical liberals who pioneered class theory, not the Marxists (twisted version). Codevilla' essay is a brilliant analysis of American society from the perspective of "libertarian class theory": the classical liberal view of politics being a struggle between 2 adversarial classes - the ruling elite vs. the rest of us.
"We the people" ignore the countless backdoor deals and shady machinations of the "ruling class" at our own peril. We've developed a strangely high tolerance for political corruption too. Hey, as long as it's "our party," it can't be all that bad ... right?
Stop and think about this for a moment ... Think back to the Nixon administration for example, and count the number of people who have come and gone through Washington's revolving door, time and time again, as part of one administration after another. It's pretty much the same people, connected to the same groups, isn't it? The Obama administration is virtually Clinton's administration, Clinton's was virtually Carter's, GWB's administration connected to Ford and Nixon ... same as it ever was.
Do you really believe that out of 330+ million American citizens, decade after decade, this small group of people just happened to be the "best and brightest?" I mean seriously, what are the odds?
Presidents and Founding Fathers Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson both warned of the "banking elite." In fact, the Second Bank of the United States (Federal Reserve) was a major campaign issue, of which President Jackson described as "the bank is trying to kill me, but I will kill it!" He further charged "beyond question that this great and powerful institution [Second Bank of the United States] had been actively engaged in attempting to influence the elections of the public officers by means of its money." His re-election campaign slogan was "JACKSON and NO BANK!" Once re-elected, he vetoed the bank's charter and promptly shut it down.
Boy, if you talk like Thomas Jefferson or Andrew Jackson today, you're mockingly labeled a "conspiracy theorist," someone not considered serious. Do we really trust our elite that much? Do you really believe it's sheer coincidence that Goldman Sachs and the U.S. Treasury are run by the same people? Would you like to buy a bridge?
Economist and historian Robert Higgs offers more insight into "America's Ruling Class -- And the Perils of Revolution."

http://the-classic-liberal.com/aig-goldman-sachs-bailout/

AIG and the Goldman Sachs Bailout

theCL 2010-06-30 Corruption, Federal Reserve

The New York Times has published an explosive story about the bailout of AIG and Goldman Sachs.
Timothy Geithner, head of the New York Federal Reserve at the time, agreed to lend AIG $85 billion in bailout cash. He also awarded the banks trading with AIG 100 cents on the dollar for debt insurance they bought from the firm.
But not only were the banks made whole (with money they do not have to pay back), but AIG had to sign a legal waiver prohibiting them from suing Goldman Sachs over mortgage deals the bank knew to be flawed.

In U.S. Bailout of A.I.G., Forgiveness for Big Banks

When the government began rescuing it from collapse in the fall of 2008 with what has become a $182 billion lifeline, A.I.G. was required to forfeit its right to sue several banks — including Goldman, Société Générale, Deutsche Bank and Merrill Lynch — over any irregularities with most of the mortgage securities it insured in the precrisis years.
But after the Securities and Exchange Commission’s civil fraud suit filed in April against Goldman for possibly misrepresenting a mortgage deal to investors, A.I.G. executives and shareholders are asking whether A.I.G. may have been misled by Goldman into insuring mortgage deals that the bank and others may have known were flawed.

Why make the banks whole while requiring a waiver from AIG? It simply doesn't make sense. Especially since we're talking about taxpayer money.

The documents also indicate that regulators ignored recommendations from their own advisers to force the banks to accept losses on their A.I.G. deals and instead paid the banks in full for the contracts. That decision, say critics of the A.I.G. bailout, has cost taxpayers billions of extra dollars in payments to the banks. It also contrasts with the hard line the White House took in 2008 when it forced Chrysler’s lenders to take losses when the government bailed out the auto giant.
“Even if it turns out that it would be a hard suit to win, just the gesture of requiring A.I.G. to scrap its ability to sue is outrageous,” said David Skeel, a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania. “The defense may be that the banking system was in trouble, and we couldn’t afford to destabilize it anymore, but that just strikes me as really going overboard.”

Could it have to do with the fact that the US Treasury Secretary at the time was Hank Paulson, former CEO of Goldman Sachs? Or the fact that the US Treasury, Federal Reserve, and Goldman Sachs are all run by the same people?

[T]he newly released Congressional documents show New York Fed officials deferring to bank executives at a time when the government was pumping hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars into the financial system to rescue bankers from their own mistakes. While Wall Street deal-making is famously hard-nosed with participants fighting for every penny, during the A.I.G. bailout regulators negotiated with the banks in an almost conciliatory fashion.
On Nov. 6, 2008, for instance, after a New York Fed official spoke with Lloyd C. Blankfein, Goldman’s chief executive, about the Fed’s A.I.G. plans, the official noted in an e-mail message to Mr. Blankfein that he appreciated the Wall Street titan’s patience. “Thanks for understanding,” the regulator said.
From the moment the government agreed to lend A.I.G. $85 billion on Sept. 16, 2008, the New York Fed, led at the time by Timothy F. Geithner, and its outside advisers all acknowledged that a rescue had to achieve two goals: stop the bleeding at A.I.G. and protect the taxpayer money the government poured into the insurer.
One of the regulators’ most controversial decisions was awarding the banks that were A.I.G.’s trading partners 100 cents on the dollar to unwind debt insurance they had bought from the firm. Critics have questioned why the government did not try to wring more concessions from the banks, which would have saved taxpayers billions of dollars.

Taxpayer money wasn't protected at all. Because if protecting taxpayers was one of their goals (which should have been their primary goal), they would have made the banks take concessions. But in no uncertain terms, everyone was focused on making the banks whole.

For its part, the Treasury appeared to be opposed to any options that did not involve making the banks whole on their A.I.G. contracts. At Treasury, a former Goldman executive, Dan H. Jester, was the agency’s point man on the A.I.G. bailout. Mr. Jester had worked at Goldman with Henry M. Paulson Jr., the Treasury secretary during the A.I.G. bailout. Mr. Paulson previously served as Goldman’s chief executive before joining the government.
Mr. Jester, according to several people with knowledge of his financial holdings, still owned Goldman stock while overseeing Treasury’s response to the A.I.G. crisis. According to the documents, Mr. Jester opposed bailout structures that required the banks to return cash to A.I.G. Nothing in the documents indicates that Mr. Jester advocated forcing Goldman and the other banks to accept a discount on the deals.
Although the value of Goldman’s shares could have been affected by the terms of the A.I.G. bailout, Mr. Jester was not required to publicly disclose his stock holdings because he was hired as an outside contractor, a job title at Treasury that allowed him to forgo disclosure rules applying to appointed officials. In late October 2008, he stopped overseeing A.I.G. after others were given that responsibility, according to Michele Davis, a spokeswoman for Mr. Jester.

Alternative bailouts schemes were proposed by Morgan Stanley, Black Rock, and Ernst & Young, requiring the banks to make concessions. But let's face it, the US Treasury is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Goldman Sachs!

One plan envisioned the government guaranteeing A.I.G.’s obligations in various ways, in much the same way the F.D.I.C. backs personal savings accounts at banks facing runs by customers. On Oct. 15, Ms. Dahlgren wrote to Mr. Geithner that the Federal Reserve board in Washington had said the New York Fed should try to get Treasury to do a guarantee. “We think this is something we need to have in our back pockets,” she wrote.
Treasury had the authority to issue a guarantee but was unwilling to do so because that would use up bailout funds. Once the guarantee was off the table, Fed officials focused on possibly buying the distressed securities insured by A.I.G. From the start, the Fed and its advisers prepared for the banks to accept discounts. A BlackRock presentation outlined five reasons why the banks should agree to such concessions, all of which revolved around the many financial benefits they would receive. BlackRock and Morgan Stanley presented a number of options, including what BlackRock called a “deep concession” in which banks would return $6.4 billion A.I.G. paid them before the bailout.
The three banks with the most to lose under these options were Société Générale, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs. Société Générale would have had to give up $322 million to $2.1 billion depending on which alternative was used; Deutsche Bank would have had to forgo $40 million to $1.1 billion, while Goldman would have had to give up $271 million to $892 million, according to the documents.

The Fed even hid the fact that they didn't attempt to get concessions from the banks.

Gift or not, the banks got 100 cents on the dollar. And on Nov. 11, 2008, a New York Fed staff member recommended that documents for explaining the bailout to the public not mention bank concessions. The Fed should not reveal that it didn’t secure concessions “unless absolutely necessary,” the staff member advised. In the end, the Fed successfully kept most of the details about its negotiations with banks confidential for more than a year, despite opposition from the media and Congress.

The whole bailout was a scam. AIG was simply used to funnel money to the banks, costing taxpayers billions.

All of this was quite different from the tack the government took in the Chrysler bailout. In that matter, the government told banks they could take losses on their loans or simply own a bankrupt company; the banks took the losses.
During the A.I.G. bailout, the Fed seemed more focused on extracting concessions from A.I.G. than from the banks. Mr. Baxter, in an interview, conceded that the way that the New York Fed handled the negotiations meant that any resulting deal “took most of the upside potential away from A.I.G.”
The legal waiver barring A.I.G. from suing the banks was not in the original document that regulators circulated on Nov. 6, 2008 to dissolve the insurer’s contracts with the banks. A day later a waiver was added but the Congressional documents show no e-mail traffic explaining why that occurred or who was responsible for inserting it. The New York Fed declined to comment.

The legal waiver undermined the financial interests of not just AIG, but all of us taxpayers too. Because if Goldman had lied about the mortgage securities AIG insured, we no longer have legal recourse. Goldman to make record bonus payout!
Timothy Geithner, Hank Paulson, Lloyd Blankfein and the rest of the Goldman/Treasury cabal should be investigated to the fullest. But I won't hold my breath waiting for that to happen.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2000_Oct_18/ai_66192565/pg_2/

Goldman Sachs Announces New Managing Directors and New Members of the Partnership Pool

Business Wire, Oct 18, 2000

Daniel A. Abut                           Frank J. Kinney, III

Anand Aithal                             Shigeki Kiritani
Yusuf A. Aliredha                        John T. Koh
Francois Andriot                         Mary Lyn V. Kurish
John G. Andrews                          Gregory D. Lee
John A. Ashdown                          Todd W. Leland
William A. Badia                         Remco O. Lenterman
Adam P. Barrett                          Johan H. Leven
Christopher M. Barter                    Richard J. Levy
Frank A. Bednarz                         Tobin V. Levy
Janet L. Bell                            P. Jeremy Lewis
Anthony D. Bernbaum                      George C. Liberopoulos
Thomas P. Berquist                       Richard C. Lightburn
John D. Bertuzzi                         Susan S. Lin
Elizabeth E. Beshel                      Anthony W. Ling
Andrew M. Bevan                          Bonnie S. Litt
Abraham Bleiberg                         Joseph Longo
Alastair M. Borthwick                    Peter B. MacDonald
Graham Branton                           Mark G. Machin
Alan J. Brazil                           John V. Mallory
Peter M. Brooks                          Blake W. Mather
Julian J. Brown                          Karen A. Matte
Melissa R. Brown                         John J. McCabe
David D. Burrows                         Lynn M. McCormick
Mark J. Carlebach                        Tracy K. McHale Stuart
Mariafrancesca Carli                     James A. McNamara
Mark Carroll                             Robert A. McTamaney
Amy L. Chasen                            Sharon I. Meers
W. Reed Chisholm, II                     Christian A. Meissner
Jane P. Chwick                           Michael A. Mendelson
Geoffrey G. Clark                        Luciana D. Miranda
Catherine M. Claydon                     Douglas D. Moffitt
Michael D. Cochrane                      R. Scott Morris
Robert G. Collins                        Kevin D. Naughton
Marcus R. Colwell                        Leslie S. Nelson
Peter H. Comisar                         Geoffrey W. Nicholson
Llewellyn C. Connolly                    Theodore E. Niedermayer
Eric J. Coutts                           Markus J. Noe-Nordberg
Meyrick Cox                              Fergal J. O'Driscoll
Brahm S. Cramer                          L. Peter O'Hagan
Nicholas P. Crapp                        Taneki Ono
Michael L. Crowl                         Calum M. Osborne
Michael D. Daffey                        Nigel M. O'Sullivan
Paul B. Daitz                            Brett R. Overacker
Jean A. De Pourtales                     James R. Paradise
Luigi de Vecchi                          Michael L. Pasternak
James D. Dilworth                        Ketan J. Patel
Joseph P. DiSabato                       Arthur J. Peponis
Suzanne O. Donohoe                       David E. Perlin
James H. Donovan                         Michel G. Plantevin
Donald J. Duet                           Roderic L. Prat
Michael L. Dweck                         B. Andrew Rabin
Gregory H. Ekizian                       Philip A. Raper
Aubrey J. Ellis                          Peter Richards
Earl S. Enzer                            Michael J. Richman
Christopher H. Eoyang                    Andrew J. Rickards
Ian J. Evans                             Paul M. Roberts
Norman Feit                              Michael S. Rotter
Jacob Y. Friedman                        John P. Rustum
Robert K. Frumkes                        Neil I. Sarnak
Richard A. Genna                         Atsuko Sato
Kenneth K. Gershenfeld                   Masanori Sato
Rajiv A. Ghatalia                        Marc P. Savini
Robert R. Gheewalla                      Erich P. Schlaikjer
Gary T. Giglio                           Thomas M. Schwartz
Pedro Gonzalez Grau                      Lisa M. Shalett
Roger H. Gordon                          Ramakrishna Shanker
Gregory M. Gould                         David G. Shell
Michael J. Graziano                      Evan W. Siddall
Carmen A. Greco                          Ralph J. Silva
Sebastian Grigg                          David T. Simons
Peter Gross                              Christine A. Simpson
Douglas A. Guzman                        Sergio E. Sotolongo
David R. Hansen                          Vickrie C. South
Arne K. Hassel                           Timothy T. Storey
Douglas C. Heidt                         Nobumichi Sugiyama
William L. Hemphill                      Johannes R. Sulzberger
David P. Hennessey                       Richard J. Sussman
Peter C. Herbert                         Watanan Suthiwartnarueput
Kenneth W. Hitchner                      Caroline H. Taylor
Peter Hollmann                           David H. Tenney
Philip Holzer                            Timothy J. Throsby
Jay D. Horine                            Peter K. Tomozawa
Zu Liu Frederick Hu                      Daniel Truell
Elizabeth A. Husted                      Gareth N. Turner
Walter V. Hutcherson                     Eiji Ueda
John S. Iglehart                         Lucas van Praag
Margaret H. Isdale                       Frederick G. Van Zijl
Hideki Ishibashi                         Ashok Varadhan
Walter A. Jackson                        Casper W. Von Koskull
Ronald H. Jacobe, Jr.                    Robert T. Wagner
Andrew R. Jessop                         Jerry T. Wattenberg
Thomas Jevon                             Gregg S. Weinstein
David M. Jimenez-Blanco                  Scott R. Weinstein
Peter T. Johnston                        Martin M. Werner
Roy R. Joseph                            C. Howard Wietschner
Marc H. Jourdren                         Keith R. Wills
Atul Kapur                               Kurt D. Winkelmann
James C. Katzman                         Melinda B. Wolfe
Carsten Kengeter                         Wassim G. Younan
Gioia M. Kennett                         Jeffrey J. Zajkowski



The following have been invited to join the Partnership Pool as of
November 25, 2000.

Raanan A. Agus                           Thomas B. Lewis, Jr.
Philippe J. Altuzarra                    Gwen R. Libstag
Zar Amrolia                              Mitchell J. Lieberman
Stuart N. Bernstein                      Syaru Shirley Lin
Jean-Luc Biamonti                        Antigone Loudiadis
Randall A. Blumenthal                    John A. Mahoney
Antonio Borges                           Sean O. Mahoney
Charles W. A. Bott                       Charles G. R. Manby
Craig W. Broderick                       Barry A. Mannis
John J. Bu                               Arthur S. Margulis
Timothy B. Bunting                       Robert J. Markwick
Lawrence V. Calcano                      Kathy M. Matsui
Richard M. Campbell-Breeden              Theresa E. McCabe
Carmine C. Capossela                     Mark E. McGoldrick
Chris Casciato                           Stephen J. McGuinness
Robert J. Christie                       John C. McIntire
Peter T. Cirenza                         Audrey A. McNiff
Laura C. Conigliaro                      Roberto Mendoza
Frank T. Connor                          Amos Meron
Karen R. Cook                            Edward S. Misrahi
Edith W. Cooper                          Jeffrey M. Moslow
Philip A. Cooper                         Ian Mukherjee
Eduardo A. Cruz                          Duncan L. Niederauer
John S. Daly                             Richard T. Ong
Simon Dingemans                          Mukesh K. Parekh
Suzanne O. Donohoe                       David B. Philip
James H. Donovan                         Stephen R. Pierce
Michael B. Dubno                         John J. Rafter
Jay S. Dweck                             Paul M. Roberts
Isabelle Ealet                           John F. W. Rogers
Herbert E. Ehlers                        Paul M. Russo
John E. Eisenberg                        Katsunori Sago
Edward K. Eisler                         Pablo J. Salame
Michael P. Esposito                      J. Michael Sanders
Charles P. Eve                           Gary B. Schermerhorn
Thomas M. Fitzgerald                     Jeffrey W. Schroeder
Shirley Fung                             Steven M. Scopellite
Emmanuel Gavaudan                        Robert J. Shea, Jr.
Robert R. Gheewalla                      Ravi M. Singh
H. John Gilbertson, Jr.                  Ravi Sinha
James S. Golob                           Edward M. Siskind
Frank J. Governali                       Michael M. Smith
David J. Greenwald                       Randolph C. Snook
Christopher Grigg                        Ronald K. Tanemura
Douglas C. Grip                          Mark J. Tracey
Charles T. Harris, III                   Harkanwar Uberoi
Nobumichi Hattori                        Hugo H. Van Vredenburch
Terry P. Hughes                          Corrado P. Varoli
William L. Jacob, III                    John J. Vaske
Dan H. Jester                            Hsueh-Ming Wang
David A. Kaplan                          David M. Weil
Robert C. King, Jr.                      Todd A. Williams
Ewan M. Kirk                             Michael S. Wishart
Mark J. Kogan                            Zi Wang Xu
Peter J. Layton                          W. Thomas York, Jr.
Kenneth H. M. Leet                       Paolo Zannoni
Hughes B. Lepic                          James P. Ziperski